







This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in City  on 7th 
October 2015, available online: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/13604813.2015.1071116.
© Taylor & Francis Inc.
The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of Westminster aims to make the 
research output of the University available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain 
with the authors and/or copyright owners.
Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, you may freely 
distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: ((http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/).
In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail repository@westminster.ac.uk
1Paul Kendall
Between Big City and Authentic Village: Branding the Small Chinese City
Abstract: 
While recent academic research has already produced an impressive corpus on big cities such as 
Shanghai and Beijing, the small Chinese city has been mostly ignored. In this article, I suggest 
that consideration of the small city can bring a new perspective on the wider urban fabric of 
which it is an element. Although small city governments have embraced urban entrepreneurialism 
with the same enthusiasm as China’s big cities, different configurations of space, branding and 
the everyday have nevertheless resulted. My case study of Kaili in Guizhou province indicates 
that the small city exists in a complex relationship with the big city and the village; it is pulled 
towards large-scale urbanization while simultaneously attempting to construct a unique city 
image based upon the evocation of rural cultural practices. The perspective from the small city 
thus suggests the need to consider the rural-urban divide – long a dominant geographical 
imagination of China – alongside other geographies, including a triad of the small city, the 
village and the big city.
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What exactly does a small city have to do in order to get noticed? Kaili, a city in 
southwest China, has tried all kinds of promotional tactics in recent years, such as staging a 
self-proclaimed ‘international’ festival of local minority customs, featuring in the torch 
relay of the Beijing Olympics, and serving as the site for the relocation of a pavilion from 
the Shanghai 2010 Expo. And yet while there has been a proliferation of scholarly interest 
in the big Chinese cities of Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou and Shenzhen, small cities such as 
Kaili continue to receive minimal attention, despite their own efforts, and despite academic 
awareness of the need to look beyond ‘paradigmatic cases’ of the urban form (Amin and 
Graham 1997, 411; Bell and Jayne 2006, 2). ‘What about Huddersfield?’ went the critique 
of spatial studies fixated on Los Angeles (Elden 1997, 48). What about the Chinese 
Huddersfields, whose combined populations constitute a substantial slice of the global 
urban experience?
In this article, I argue that our understanding of urban China could benefit from some 
consideration of the small city. My classification of ‘small city’ relies upon considerations of 
administrative ranking, representational power, city dynamism, and citizens’ self-identification.i 
2In administrative terms, all Chinese cities exist within a sophisticated five-tier hierarchy. The first 
tier consists of the four direct-controlled, provincial-level municipalities of Beijing, Shanghai, 
Chongqing and Tianjin. The second-tier is also a select group, of fifteen sub-provincial-level 
cities, including the likes of Shenzhen, Qingdao and Xi’an, as major urban centres which are 
located within provinces but enjoy significant autonomy from provincial government. Cities in 
these two elite tiers not only possess substantial administrative power, but also a high level of 
representational power, as nationally or even internationally famous places, which hold mega-
events and receive varying degrees of scholarly attention. These are big cities, where 
concentrations of people, institutions and enterprises have produced a cosmopolitan dynamism 
that has come to represent all of urban China, through fast-cutting montages of the futuristic 
Shanghai skyline or time-lapse filming of the ever-active streets below. The relationship between 
representational power and dynamism is also two-way; a well-known city attracts ambitious 
enterprises and people, who in turn contribute to the bolstering of the city brand.
The third, fourth and fifth administrative tiers contain the vast majority of Chinese cities: 
third-tier prefecture-level cities come under the direct jurisdiction of provinces; fifth-tier county-
level cities come under the jurisdiction of prefectures; and a small number of cities are 
sandwiched between these two tiers as sub-prefectural-level cities.ii In the upper echelons of these 
less administratively privileged places, many prefecture-level cities possess the necessary 
dynamism and representational clout to be classifiable as big cities. Guiyang, for example, is a 
big city, as the capital of Guizhou province and therefore nationally well-known, even if 
knowledge of the city’s characteristics may be hazy. Furthermore, as a provincial capital, it is the 
default location of provincial-level government organs, as well as major cultural institutions (e.g. 
Guiyang Symphony Orchestra, Guizhou University). 
In contrast, county-level Kaili – also located in Guizhou province – can be categorized as a 
small city. Not well known outside of Guizhou and neighbouring provinces – despite the branding 
efforts documented here – Kaili lacks the major cultural institutions that contribute to city 
dynamism. And most importantly, Kaili is home to inhabitants who tend to self-identify with a 
small-city lifestyle and to define this lifestyle – often positively – against that of big cities. This 
became obvious during the nine months of fieldwork which I conducted in the city, mainly during 
2011 and 2012, and which consisted of participant observation in everyday leisure activities 
supplemented by 289 recorded unstructured interviews and textually-based research. Of the 
various themes, which emerged during participant observation,iii the most relevant to this article 
was local inhabitants’ conceptualization of Kaili as a small city in relation to other settlement 
types. On the one hand, everyday conversation in Kaili referred to the slow pace of life, 
3cleanliness, and value for money of small cities in comparison to the stress, pollution and 
exorbitance of big cities. On the other hand, inhabitants described Kaili as urbanized, modernized 
and sinicized in comparison to the surrounding villages. The perspective from this small city thus 
suggests the co-existence of the rural-urban divide – long a dominant geographical imagination of 
China – alongside a triad of the small city, the village, and the big city.iv Moreover, this spatial 
triad can be detected not only in the everyday life of Kaili, but also wielded to analyze the city’s 
branding and its conflicting relationships with both built environment and everyday life. In 
particular, it can help to explain why the promotional literature on Kaili – as the primary focus of 
this article – tends to oscillate, without warning, between the city proper and the official 
administrative boundaries of the city, which include huge swathes of rural territory.
If we live in an era of planetary urbanization, and there is ‘no longer an outside to the urban 
world’ (Brenner and Schmid 2014, 751), then perhaps it is unsurprising that branding might 
conflate villages with cities. Recent declarations of planetary urbanization (e.g. Merrifield 2013, 
Brenner and Schmid 2014) have been influenced by the works of Henri Lefebvre, including his 
notion of the urban fabric (see 1996, 71-3 [1968] and 2003, 3-4 [1970]), which is worth briefly 
revisiting. Not confined to agglomerations of goods, wealth, people and buildings, the urban 
fabric constitutes ‘all manifestations of the dominance of the city over the country’, including 
vacation homes, highways and supermarkets in rural areas (Lefebvre 2003, 4 [1970]). While 
extending beyond urban centres, the urban fabric also erodes them, so that there can be no easily 
identifiable boundaries dividing the world into discrete urban and rural segments.
However, this urban fabric is also a ‘net of uneven mesh’ (Lefebvre 1996, 71 [1968]). Rather 
than constituting a single blanket category of urban homogenization to replace the discrete 
categories of rural and urban, Lefebvre’s urban fabric suggests a complicated hotchpotch of 
settlement types. Old spaces do not usually just disappear in Lefebvre’s geographical histories of 
the world, but are rather subsumed and dominated by new layers of space (e.g. 1991a, 164, 229 
[1974]). Thus, a ‘village’ in this article does not indicate some pre-modern rural holdout, but 
rather a settlement, which still produces rural images and associations, despite having been 
permeated by urban processes. In the case of Kaili, the villages of its administrative periphery are 
part of the urban fabric for the very reason that their rural images and associations have been co-
opted by urban-based authorities for branding purposes. With his notion of the urban fabric, 
Lefebvre does not specifically refer to this extension of urban branding into rural areas. However, 
it is unsurprising that a largely Europe-bound theory of the twentieth century might itself have to 
be extended in order to accommodate the conditions of a small city in contemporary China.  
4In identifying settlement categories within the urban fabric, I am mindful of Jennifer 
Robinson’s (2006) postcolonial critique, which argues that we should simply treat all cities as 
ordinary, and condemns any categorization of cities. To replace the old Western/Third World city 
binary with a new form of disciplinary fragmentation based on considerations of scale is certainly 
not the intention here. But does actual discrimination end when conceptual categories are 
abolished? Following her critique of existing categories, Robinson (2006, chap. 3) outlines a 
more inclusive ‘cosmopolitan urban studies’ in order ‘to decouple the modern from its privileged 
association with the West’, with accompanying case studies of New York, Rio de Janeiro, Kuala 
Lumpur, Lusaka, and Johannesburg. Yet while this list successfully straddles the West/Third 
World divide, these cities are all national centres of economy, culture and/or politics. It might 
therefore require initial recognition of the categories of big and small city in order to produce a 
collection of case studies which better represents the diversity of settlements within the urban 
fabric: New York, Huddersfield, Huế, Liupanshui and Salvador, for example.
The Rural, the Industrial and the Urban in Kaili
In terms of China-specific literature, conclusions based almost exclusively upon big city 
experience are limited rather than irrelevant to the study of a small city. Most usefully, existing 
literature has noted China’s policy shift from industrialism to urbanism (Hsing 2010, 19), 
including the interlinked emergence of city branding (e.g. Oakes 2000; Brownell 2001), staging 
of mega-events (e.g. Broudehoux 2007; Shin 2012), and transformation of the built environment 
(e.g. Ma and F. Wu 2005; Lu 2006; F. Wu 2009). Both big and small city governments have 
embraced urban entrepreneurialism with enthusiasm, while the industrialism-to-urbanism shift 
has been particularly pronounced in Kaili. Prior to significant urbanization, the Kaili municipal 
area experienced early development as a part of the Third Front, a massive industrial project 
which operated between 1964 and 1978. With the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership 
anxious about the vulnerability of coastal industry in the event of foreign invasion, the Third 
Front was established as a military industrial zone over some of the most inaccessible terrain of 
inland China. The small settlement of Kaili subsequently found itself surrounded by self-
contained and centrally-directed ‘rusticated factories’ (Naughton 1988, 383), as industrial work 
units and their workers relocated from big cities to the Third Front region. The concomitant 
development of transportation infrastructure linked these factories together, as well as facilitating 
the construction of local-run factories (Gu 1989, 264; Ni 1997, 3). However, by the time of my 
fieldwork, many Third Front and local-run factories had already been swallowed by an expanding 
Kaili city, while other factories lay in ruins on the city outskirts, awaiting transformation into 
5private apartment buildings or other spaces of consumption. This industrial legacy is almost 
absent from contemporary city branding, given the nationwide shift away in emphasis from 
industrialism towards city-based consumerism, as well as the fact that the Third Front was once 
shrouded in secrecy as a military project, and is posthumously shrouded in shame as a wasteful 
failure.
 Images of polluting and homogenous industrial spaces also conflict with Kaili’s 
contemporary branding as a tourist destination where people can escape the stress of the big city 
and experience authentic minority culture rooted in rural place. Monikers attached to Kaili, such 
as the ‘homeland of 100 festivals’ and ‘ocean of song and dance’ (e.g. KSSX 2010, 60), refer to 
the festivals of minority groups, who have long been associated with the most remote and rural 
parts of China, rather than industrial production. The promotion of such festivals exploits a 
domestic, and even global, fascination with the cultures of China’s 55 official minorities – 
especially those in the southwest – that anthropologist Louisa Schein (1997) has termed ‘internal 
orientalism’. Within this discourse, the minority is depicted as young, female, rural and close to 
nature, in contrast to the modern, male urbanite of the Han majority. This depiction can be 
observed across a wide array of formats, from backpacker guides to televised national singing 
competitions, where minorities are celebrated for their supposed innate talent in the performance 
of authentic traditions. 
In contrast, it was sometimes not so much a matter of celebrating minority cultures as 
absorbing them into a uniform factory culture during the later years of the Mao era. Despite the 
state’s relatively tolerant approach to ethnic diversity in the 1950s, older perceptions of minorities 
as primitive remained socially embedded, producing the belief that the Han Chinese needed to 
help minorities ‘catch up’ on the road to socialism.v With the onset of the post-Mao era, these 
continued assumptions about the primitive authenticity of minority culture have been exploited by 
Kaili in its new guise as a tourist destination. At the same time, Deng Xiaoping’s market reforms 
contributed to the terminal decline of once crucial industrial units, whose inaccessibility became a 
hindrance only to economic efficiency rather than invading enemies. The post-Mao era has thus 
seen something of a reversal in the fortunes of minority and industrial cultures, as well as their 
representation, so that the contemporary branding of Kaili stresses rural minority customs while 
eliding the region’s industrial history. 
Figure 1: An abandoned Third Front factory unit behind ethnicized walls. 
Photograph: Paul Kendall
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6In its preservation and depiction of rural minority customs, the small city of Kaili largely 
departs from trends of heritage and place promotion found in the big cities of China. Significant 
scholarly effort has been devoted to documenting urban heritage in cities such as Beijing and 
Xi’an, including critiques of urban heritage as piecemeal and powerless in the face of 
marketization and modernization (Wang 2000), as a strategy for gentrification and the promotion 
of real estate (Shin 2010), and as a means towards the inscription of nationalistic fervour on to the 
built environment (Broudehoux 2004). In contrast, Kaili is notable for the absence of local efforts 
to preserve and promote actual city districts. This is not only because it lacks the ancient 
alleyways and walls of a Beijing or Xi’an, or the colonial architecture of a Shanghai or Qingdao, 
having been largely constructed from the 1950s onwards. Rather, the very presence of a 
substantial city area poses a problem for the ethnic-oriented tourist image of Kaili, since minority 
culture in China is typically associated with the village rather than the city.vi Branding therefore 
attempts to convey a certain rural flavour. Yet at the same time, local government has striven to 
transform Kaili into a big city – and discredit the association of minority regions with rural 
backwardness – with the aim of constructing an urban area of 800km2 by 2015, to be inhabited by 
a population of 600,000 (Y. Yang 2009, 1; D. Wu, Z. Yang, and G. Wu 2011, 1). This process of 
urbanism began during the mid-1990s and gathered pace during the early 2000s, with the 
instigation of a ‘civilizing project’ geared towards the facilitation of traffic, the development of 
urban infrastructure, the ordering of the populace and the sanitization of streets. In a sense, this 
process has been coherently aligned with the desire to create a clean and well-ordered tourist 
destination. However, it has also created a dense city environment at odds with the rural qualities 
associated with minority customs, which constitute the main tourist attraction. During fieldwork, I 
also found the urbanized environment to be inhabited by many individuals who declared 
themselves sinicized ‘fake’ minorities, and who insisted that there were no minority practices of 
note within Kaili itself, as a consequence of urbanization. For local residents, the city produced 
modernity rather than ethnicity.
The attempt to develop unique city images alongside a relatively homogenous urban 
infrastructure is perhaps the key contradiction of urbanism for many up-and-coming cities in 
China. In a welcome article on another small Chinese city, Marc Blecher (2008, 177) noted the 
desire of a local official for the attainment of ‘middle-sized city’ status. While a county-level city 
such as Kaili has no realistic expectation of obtaining ‘global’ or ‘world’ city status, climbing a 
rank within China’s administrative hierarchy is a more achievable goal, which brings political 
prestige to local leaders as well as economic gains. However, for a city which relies on the 
promotion of ethnic tourism for development, attempts to improve economic and administrative 
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befits a tourist destination, the branding of Kaili has stressed minority customs located in rural 
place. As befits an ambitious and competitive city, the increasingly modern built environment of 
Kaili has been mostly antithetical to such branding portrayals. 
A Strategy of Synecdoche: Ethnic Spectacles
Kaili’s branding produces associations with rural minority customs despite ongoing 
urbanization through the combination of at least two strategies, only one of which has received 
extensive analysis in existing academic literature. The first strategy is the physical branding of 
absolute space, which is somewhat comparable to the ‘strategy of synecdoche’ outlined by 
Doreen Massey (2007), but with a particular focus on the construction of ethnicized public 
spaces. The second strategy is an altogether more curious affair, as a blurring of urban centre and 
rural periphery in promotional literature which has been facilitated by linguistic vagueness and 
the spatial-administrative qualities of China’s municipalities. 
When Massey wrote about a strategy of synecdoche, she was mainly referring to the 
branding of the city economy, and specifically the promotion of the financial industry as if it was 
London’s only industry (2007, 41–2). Although the relevant book, World Cities, did not devote 
significant consideration to how this strategy is also extended to the built environment, the 
process is clear enough; financial sites (e.g. the Bank of England, Canary Wharf) and tourist 
attractions (the Tower of London, Millennium Bridge) are separated from their surroundings and 
fused together to represent the whole. These spectacles are all located within the centre of 
London, or constructed close to the centre in a way that their location may slightly reposition the 
centre in popular imagination. Outer suburbs such as Bromley and Bexley, meanwhile, are as 
invisible as the less affluent inner city areas of Lambeth and Southwark. 
Kaili’s relationship with its periphery is an entirely different matter, but it is first worth 
considering how a local government can exploit the relatively low built density of a small city to 
construct central public spaces which bolster the city image. In order to facilitate the presentation 
of Kaili as a tourist destination, public spaces have been constructed in a style intended to evoke 
minority culture. These spaces are photographed, separated from their immediate, ordinary 
surroundings and then assembled alongside each other in promotional literature, to convey the 
impression of Kaili as the homeland of 100 festivals. In the next few paragraphs, I describe some 
of these spaces, the impetus for their construction, and their operation in conjunction with 
occasional government-led festive events.
8Since Kaili’s designation as a prefectural capital in the 1950s, the busy junction of Dashizi 
has constituted its infrastructural heart. As recently as the 1980s, its roundabout island doubled as 
a small garden, with a white pagoda at its centre. However, a local newspaper contributor in the 
mid-1980s considered this pagoda a blemish rather than an adornment, on account of its toy-like 
size; ‘Could the pagoda not be transformed into something bigger, which also reflects our 
homeland’s special [i.e. minority] characteristics?’, asked the contributor (Pan 1985, 2). This 
question was not properly answered until 1996, by which time small inland cities had become far 
more aware of the need to brand themselves, with the construction of a giant statue of a musical 
instrument in place of the pagoda. The instrument depicted was a lusheng, a free-reed wind 
instrument described by academics, tourist organizations and Kaili residents as a cultural marker 
of the local Miao minority. This giant lusheng was additionally encircled by a grey-white band 
and three slabs designed to represent bull horns, since water buffalo fighting is also associated 
with the Miao minority. The statue’s location at the heart of the city was attributed to its status as 
the ‘soul of the highlands’ by local literature, which declared that it encapsulated the essence of 
the city and the wider prefecture through the representation of minority culture (Long 1996, 2; 
Qiandongnan ribao 2009, 8).
Figures 2 and 3: The Dashizi lusheng statue occupied the city centre during fieldwork, but 
sightings of actual lusheng were relatively rare. Photographs: Paul Kendall
Despite the central prominence of this giant lusheng, an article in a provincial CCP journal at 
the turn of the century criticized the general lack of minority-style architecture in Kaili and other 
nearby cities (Zhou and Xia 2002). The article complained that buildings were grey, simplistic, 
cheap, multi-storey affairs, with a lack of ‘landmark architecture’, while the air was saturated 
with the smells of industry: ‘Apart from Kaili’s Dashizi, with its lusheng statue carved out of 
marble, there are basically no buildings or statues in these cities with special characteristics, and it 
is even harder to find a trace of minority culture’ (Zhou and Xia 2002, 72). In order to remedy 
this situation, the writers stated the need for the creation of leisure spaces which could reflect 
minority customs (Zhou and Xia 2002, 74).
Subsequent years saw the construction of a number of public spaces with minority 
characteristics, including squares, a stadium, and even bus stops. The surfaces of squares were 
embellished with a pattern of circles within circles, in depiction of a Miao copper drum, while bus 
stops were topped with representations of Miao silver head-dresses. Most spectacular of all was 
the Nationalities Stadium, whose scale made the older areas of Kaili look like those of a 
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covered construction associated with the Dong, another local minority. 
Therefore, within just a few years of the critical assessment of the CCP journal, Kaili could 
claim to possess a number of central leisure spaces with ethnic flavour (SB and SRZB 2007, 3; 
KSSX 2010, 61). Local government conceived of these spaces as both providers of leisure 
facilities and marketers of the city (KSGGJ 2008, 4; Qiandongnan ribao 2008, 6). A building 
such as the Nationalities Stadium subsequently operates within two spatial dimensions: 
surrounded by the traffic, pedestrians and leisure activity of everyday life; and surrounded by 
other examples of branded space in promotional photomontages of the city. In the latter 
dimension, these buildings and their images have conveyed a misleading impression of everyday 
life in Kaili. No-one viewing these photos without supporting knowledge could guess that the 
local pastimes are mahjong, line dancing, ballroom dancing, karaoke, night markets, and 
drinking, rather than lusheng dancing and antiphonal singing. This distortion has been achieved 
through synecdoches of both space and time; photos of ethnic architecture function most 
effectively when these buildings serve as the backdrop for temporary and occasional 
performances of ethnicity during organized performances.vii Extracted from clock-time by 
photography, these costume-led spectacles become permanent to give the impression that life in 
Kaili is just one long ethnic festival. 
By itself, this construction of attractive central spaces for the purposes of branding does not 
entirely distinguish Kaili from big Chinese cities. Similar to the likes of Beijing, small cities are 
also starting to suffer from constraints of space in their centres, so that new spectacles can only be 
constructed through land grabs, the destruction of older monuments, or the creation of new urban 
districts. The effects of a tightening built environment was seen in Kaili in early 2014, with the 
demolishment of the lusheng state at Dashizi, as what once seemed like an immovable object of 
branding yielded to the irresistible force of infrastructural demands, with crippling traffic jams in 
recent years facilitating the need for a larger intersection. This occurrence demonstrates that even 
synecdoches are fluid; newer ethnic spectacles have mostly been built in the relatively new 
southern district of Kaili, as the city expands to the south and west. However, as the following 
section argues, the branding of Kaili does not only rely upon ethnic architecture in the city centre, 
but also draws upon the villages of a rural periphery. The result is a somewhat confusing blurring 
of centre and periphery, city and village. 
The Blurring of Centre and Periphery
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The strategy of synecdoche outlined in the previous section has been an intentional effort to 
create a specific image of Kaili through the construction of ethnicized public spaces. In contrast, 
the accompanying blurring of periphery and centre is perhaps more a consequence of linguistic 
and administrative idiosyncrasies than intentional manipulation. I illustrate this branding strategy 
through reference to a short article written by the propaganda department of the Kaili city party 
committee (KSSX 2010). The two-page article adheres to a spatial template common to much of 
the promotional literature on Kaili. It begins by situating Kaili geographically and listing official 
titles, for example mentioning that Kaili is a prefectural capital and an outstanding tourist 
city/town.viii Following this introduction, the article focuses on minority customs, with sections on 
festivals, the lusheng, and bull-fighting, all of which are located in Kaili. But what is this Kaili in 
which these customs are located? The first section to follow the introduction, entitled ‘The 
homeland of one hundred festivals’, begins by describing Kaili as a ‘multi-minzu city/town’; the 
Chinese word ‘chengshi’ is even more nebulous than the concept of ‘city’, but it does 
unequivocally denote an urban settlement. There are no population statistics in the introduction, 
so it is difficult at this point, assuming no prior knowledge on the part of the reader, to deduce the 
spatial specifics of Kaili from the text alone. However, a fuzzy panoramic photo of Kaili, 
surrounded by mountains, appears at the top of the page, carrying the caption ‘highland style’ 
(gaoyuan fengcai). Scrutiny of both text and photo should therefore lead to the tentative 
conclusion that Kaili is a small city. 
In many ways, this conclusion is correct, Kaili is a small city. However, it is also a 
municipality (shi). Specifically, it is one of many municipalities created during the 1980s, when 
changes to administrative rules meant that the boundaries of new municipalities encompassed the 
entire county areas that they replaced, rather than just those of an existing urban centre (Chan 
1994: 26–7). As a consequence, Kaili municipality came to include not only a small urban centre, 
around Dashizi, but also a huge rural periphery. This process of urbanization through 
administration contrasts sharply with that of early post-socialist Russia, for example, where many 
small urban settlements were downgraded to rural status in order to circumnavigate restrictions on 
the privatization of urban land, as well as benefit from lower prices of electricity, gas and other 
commodities (Molodikova and Makhrova 2007, 55). 
According to official terminology, ‘Kaili shi’ refers to Kaili municipality. However, the ‘shi’ 
may also be dropped, so that a reference to ‘Kaili’ could refer to either the city proper or the 
entire municipality. Following initial references to Kaili as a ‘city’ (chengshi), the text draws 
attention to Kaili’s reputation as the homeland of 100 festivals, and in doing so, shifts its scope 
from the city to the 1,306km2 of the municipality, over across which twhere is a claimed average 
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of one festival every 10km2. The space of the municipality is homogenized with this statistic, with 
no indication of any disparity between city and village. There is no direct announcement to 
indicate that the article has shifted from city proper to municipality; no usage of the word ‘shi’, 
just a reference to 1,306km2, which would seem far too large (if read carefully) to be a city. 
A couple of sentences later, the article does refer to the fact that different villages hold their 
festivals at different dates. This is a more spatially specific statement, and yet it is made primarily 
to assure tourists that there is a good chance of encountering a festival no matter when they come 
to ‘Kaili’. This statement could refer to either Kaili municipality or city. The reference to villages 
makes the former seem more likely, yet the fact that the article labels itself as an introduction to 
the ‘city/town’ (chengshi) of Kaili – carrying the subheading ‘city soul’ and without a single 
reference to ‘Kaili shi’ (municipality) – also makes the latter a coherent possibility. The article 
then mentions the most famous local festival, the ‘China: Kaili Gannangxiang International 
Lusheng Festival’. The article does not immediately explain where this festival is held, but the 
answer is contained in the name: the festival is held simultaneously in both Kaili city and 
Gannangxiang, a lusheng arena in Zhouxi town (zhen), located in the wider Kaili municipality. 
As the article progresses on to a second page, there is a clearer focus on the visually rural 
spaces of Kaili municipality under a section entitled ‘Rural tourism overflows with minzu 
flavour’. There is even mention of a specific space, Nanhua village, as a popular tourist 
destination. Finally, the article returns to the city itself, with references to centrally located 
architecture such as the Nationalities Stadium. The article clearly situates these buildings within 
the main neighbourhood districts of Kaili city (Kaili chengqu zhuyao jiedao). This section also 
contains a sentence referring to the ‘authentic ethnic culture’ of ‘Kaili’. This would seem to be a 
reference to the wider Kaili municipality, yet the context suggests otherwise: the section is 
entitled ‘City architecture embodies Miao and Dong culture’; and the specific sentence states that 
authentic ethnic culture is one of the reasons why Kaili deserves the name of ‘international tourist 
city’. The section then stresses the need to increase the pace of city construction by fusing 
economic development with cultural tourism. In spatial summary, the article begins with the city, 
expands to the municipality to include various rural minority customs, and then returns to the city.
Photographs accompanying the article include pictures of the Nationalities Stadium and a 
picturesque village, to offer a good example of how the strategy of synecdoche works alongside 
the blurring of centre and periphery. The photo of the ethnicized city stadium conveys a definite 
impression of minority culture. However, a more convincing representation of Kaili as the 
location of rural minority customs is offered by photos of Miao villages in the wider municipal 
area. Combine the two, and Kaili begins to look like the homeland of 100 festivals. 
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This blurring of centre and periphery is not confined to a single article and its photos. For 
example, an article in the publication China Place Name unequivocally describes Kaili as a ‘city 
which possesses thick ethnic flavour, with a rich abundance of ethnic craftsmanship, festivals and 
song-and-dance’ (Xiao 2008, 38). In a further example, an article in a party journal uses a stock 
phrase for texts on Kaili, describing it as ‘a Miao-dominated multi-ethnic city, thick with ethnic 
customs’ (Chen 2003, 32). And yet this is also a text which celebrates the transformation of Kaili 
into a ‘civilized city’ through the imposition of orderly urbanization, that is, the imposition of 
qualities which are at odds with the common assumption in China that minority customs exist in 
pre-modern rural place.
The blurred wording of many such descriptions contributed substantially to some of my own 
confused expectations about Kaili, which were later resolved by the direct experience of urban 
space. Having seen photos of villages and Miao-style public spaces, I was somewhat nonplussed 
by the environment I encountered upon first arriving in Kaili for fieldwork, first at the train 
station, in a gritty part of the city, and then as I travelled through the centre by taxi. Superficially, 
Kaili looked, sounded and smelled like just any other Chinese city, with an excess of traffic, 
piped music and high-rise buildings. On the one hand, I had anticipated this, having already 
collected a fair amount of statistical data which indicated that references to the city as ‘thick with 
ethnic customs’ might not be accurate portrayals. However, I had still somehow simultaneously 
harboured the expectation that Kaili would have maintained a certain rural ethnic flavour.
Figure 4:  Looking down on Kaili city, approximately five kilometres from Dashizi.
Photograph: Paul Kendall
Beyond being spatially elusive, promotional literature also plays tricks with time. Lusheng 
festivals, also known as lusheng meets, are an essential part of Kaili’s tourism promotion. Such 
festivals combine all of the exotic cultural activities associated with the Miao into one spectacle, 
with lusheng dancing, unaccompanied singing, courting, costume ritual and bull-fighting. Henri 
Lefebvre (1991b, 202, 207 [1958]) argued that festivals are intensifications of everyday life, 
rather than operating outside of everyday life. The difference between festivals and everyday life 
is therefore a partially relative one. If there was a festival every day, then there would be no 
detectable variation in the intensity of life, and thus no day would be identifiable as a festival day. 
For Lefebvre, a festival everyday would be akin to a ‘permanent cultural revolution’ (1971, 38, 
194 [1968]),ix but this is not quite the notion the branding of Kaili wishes to convey! More 
prosaically, a travel destination needs to attract tourists all year round, rather than for just one or 
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two festive days. Kaili has therefore attempted to promote itself, like many tourist cities, as a 
place ‘where an unceasing flow of events constantly unfolds’ (Judd and Fainstein 1999: 4), 
through the strategy of expanding the parameters of branding to include the festivals of a 
substantial rural hinterland. 
By itself, the settlement of Kaili has never hosted more than a handful of festivals during the 
PRC era. References to 100 or more festivals rely on the aforementioned strategy of blurring 
space, by expanding without announcement from Kaili city to Kaili municipality. Moreover, 
different settlements within the wider municipality tend to hold the same festival at different 
times. One village will host the festival for a few days, before it moves on to the next village, and 
so on. The festival thus maintains its relative intensity over normal everyday life by moving from 
settlement to settlement. Such a festival can be counted in the plural for branding purposes. 
Similarly, the number of festivals is swollen by the fragmented nature of the Miao group, with 
sub-groups celebrating different events. For example, the main festivities around the Zhouxi town 
(zhen) administrative area took place in the first lunar month, in accordance with the Chinese 
New Year. In contrast, a village in the Sankeshu town administrative area primarily celebrated the 
so-called Miao New Year, which occurred during the tenth lunar month. Thus, the vast majority 
of these festivals take place at the same time, during the first month of the lunar year. This is the 
worst possible season from the perspective of tourism, as a time when the area is damp and cold. 
The effects of climate are exacerbated by the lack of central heating in south China. However, the 
temporal concentration of festive activity into a winter month disappears as soon as festivals are 
reduced into a simple per annum statistic. Just as space is homogenized with the claim of one 
festival every 10km2, so time is homogenized with the claim that there is ‘a small festival every 
day, and a big festival every three days’ (e.g. Qiandongnan ribao 2006: 11; KSSX 2010: 60).
Concluding Remarks: The Small City, Centrality and the Everyday 
Rather than China’s era of urbanism being simply one of ‘cities leading counties’ in 
economic development (see Cartier [2005, 26–7] for a description of this policy), Kaili’s branding 
suggests a more complicated relationship between the village, the small city and the big city. The 
small city of Kaili is caught between a need to satisfy the perceived demands of big city tourists 
for rural authenticity and a desire to urbanize its way up the domestic administrative hierarchy of 
cities.x This paradox of urban development and rural evocation indicates a relationship between 
urban centre and rural periphery, which does not entirely accord with typical discourses of centre 
and periphery. As described by Carolyn Cartier (2013, 79-80), the periphery is typically 
pronounced backward by the centre, and expected to emulate the centre in order to catch up. In 
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contrast, the urban centre of Kaili relies on the rural imagery of its periphery for branding. There 
is therefore the need for the periphery to preserve the appearance of rural minority culture rather 
than emulate the modernization of the centre, in order to facilitate appropriate branding.
While there is no space here for detailed ethnographic description, it should be stressed that 
oppositions of urban and rural, and of centre and periphery, did not blur in the everyday life of 
Kaili in the way that they did within the language of branding. Indeed, the strength of everyday 
symbolism attached to Kaili’s centre undermines Lefebvre’s assertion in Right to the City (1996, 
73 [1968]) that the urban fabric and centrality are opposites, and that urban centres have gone into 
decline to become little more than tourist destinations for those who once lived in them. Andy 
Merrifield (2011, 475–8; 2012, 275–6) has critiqued Lefebvre’s ideas of the city and centrality in 
previous issues of CITY, noting that people can create absolute new centres elsewhere when old 
centres have become zones of exclusion. The perspective from a small Chinese city is again 
somewhat different, since the absolute centre itself was a site of contested meaning, as local 
inhabitants created their own conceptualizations of what their city symbolized. In contrast to the 
image of Kaili as the homeland of 100 festivals, local acquaintances constantly stressed to me that 
the centre lacked cultural practices worthy of research, and that I should instead head to the rural 
periphery, where I could study the culturally authentic music of ‘genuine peasants’. Rather than 
understanding the likes of the Dashizi lusheng statue as representative of the city’s ethnic 
character, citizens simply used these central spectacles as points of entertainment and orientation 
in the navigation of urban everyday life; in an amusing example from a local newspaper, one Mr 
Chen mourned the destruction of the lusheng statue since it had served as his directional marker 
after heavy drinking sessions (Luo 2013, A13).
Figure 5: Everyday customs in Kaili city: a singing busker performs beneath the Dashizi statue.
Photograph: Paul Kendall
Finally, there was also a partial reconfiguration of the hierarchical relationship between 
small city and big city within the realm of everyday life in Kaili. Local acquaintances were quick 
to recommend rural cultural practices to visitors from the big cities, without themselves being 
enthusiastic consumers. To an extent, they were humouring visitors such as myself, whether from 
London or Beijing, when they waxed lyrical about minority customs, as something which might 
impress inexperienced outsiders, but in which they had no personal interest. If big city visitors 
were the consumers of rural minority practices, those who lived in Kaili were close enough to 
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know the product, but not so close that they themselves would generally engage in such rural 
practices, given their urban status. 
Such are the contradictions of this small city, as it defines itself against the village while 
utilizing rural imagery for branding purposes, and as it defines itself against the big city while 
attempting to climb China’s urban hierarchy. Such contradictions of self-definition emerge in part 
because small cities are caught between two dominant images of China, as a nation of either 
timeless villages or either futuristic metropolis. It is helped that further study of small cities can 
complicate this rural-urban binary and introduce a third perspective on China, from where it is 
possible to reconsider urban processes which are universally present but which do not necessarily 
yield universal forms or experiences of the urban fabric.
Paul Kendall is a lecturer in Chinese Studies at the University of Westminster. His research 
interests include social space, music and sound, small cities, ethnicity, tourism, and authenticity. 
Email: p.kendall1@westminster.ac.uk 
i
 My notions of representational power and self-identification are somewhat comparable with Bell and 
Jayne’s consideration of what constitutes a small city. Rather than representational power, Jayne and Bell 
point to the importance of a city’s reach and influence (Bell and Jayne 2006, 4-5). In regard to self-
identification, smallness appears to be regarded as an entirely negative trait by Bell and Jayne, who state 
that ‘small meant small-minded more than small-sized’ in cities such as Stoke-on-Trent, and ‘You are only 
as small as you think you are - or as other cities make you feel’ (2006, 3, 5). Conversely, the view from 
Kaili suggests that smallness can be regarded by residents as a positive trait in a city. 
ii
 While F. Wu et al. (2007, 124-5) describe this five-tier hierarchy, it is also common to omit the sub-
prefectural- and sub-provincial levels, leaving a basic three-tier system of provincial-, prefectural- and 
county-level cities.
iii
 See Kendall 2014 for a description of early fieldwork and the emergence of other fieldwork themes.
iv
 The rural-urban divide is a thoroughly entrenched geographical imagining of China, having been 
administratively solidified by the household registration system in 1958, which divided the population into 
two categories: agricultural and non-agricultural. However, a second aspect of the household registration 
was a more specific designation of location (e.g. Beijing, Tianjin, Kaili). There has therefore always been a 
more sophisticated spatial hierarchy co-existing alongside the basic rural-urban divide, with big city 
registration more prestigious than small city registration. See Fan (2007, chap. 3) for details on the 
household registration system).
v
 See Harrell (1995) for a description of the Confucian civilizing efforts aimed at minorities before the 
establishment of the PRC, and how the CCP inherited Confucian assumptions about primitive minorities.
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vi
 The link between minority heritage and national identity is also quite different to the feelings of 
nationalism stoked by historical sites such as Yuanmingyuan (see Broudehoux 2004, chapter 3). As 
described by Schein (1997), minorities are simultaneously represented as an important element within the 
(multicultural) Chinese nation and as a exotic, almost foreign counterpoint to the Han nation.
vii
 The combination of landmark buildings and mega-events has already been noted by Briavel Holcomb 
(1999, 58), the difference being that Kaili has elected to create its own ‘international’ events, given the 
impossibility of a small Chinese city successfully competing for the Summer Olympics or World Expo.
viii
 ‘Outstanding tourist city’ is an official title which was awarded to Kaili by the National Tourism 
Administration of the PRC in 2004 (Li, Xu, and Wang 2008).
ix
 As well as arguing that festivals could not be considered separate from everyday life, Lefebvre asserted 
the wild frenzy of the peasant festival was the antithesis of the modern everyday, and could be harnessed to 
achieve ‘a transfiguration of everyday life’ (1971, 38 [1968]). The first argument, about the inseparability 
of festivals from everyday life, is more relevant to Kaili, whose festivals did not seem during my fieldwork 
to be likely catalysts for radical social change.
x
 Whether tourists from the big cities are actually in search of the authentic is certainly debatable (see 
Oakes 2005, 183-4), but there is certainly a belief in Kaili that cosmopolitan types are authenticity-seekers.
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